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## COLONIAL IMPERIALISM

THE PHILIPPINE POLICY OF THE ADMINISTRATION—A POLICY WHICH HAS  
TARNISHED THE HONOR OF THE NATION, A POLICY OF BURDENSOME TAX-  
ATION, UNWARRANTED EXPENDITURE OF MONEY, AND WASTE OF HUMAN  
LIFE, AND A POLICY WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES UPON WHICH  
OUR FORM OF GOVERNMENT RESTS.

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## SPEECH

OF

*revised*  
HON. HENRY F. NAPHEN,

OF MASSACHUSETTS,

IN THE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

THURSDAY, MAY 17, 1900.

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WASHINGTON.

1900.

*H. F. R.*



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SPEECH  
OF  
HON. HENRY F. NAPHEN.

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The House having under consideration the bill (S. 3419) making further provision for a civil government for Alaska, and for other purposes—

Mr. NAPHEN said:

Mr. SPEAKER: I shall avail myself of the latitude allowed in debate on this bill by confining myself to another subject, one which is of more importance than the bill under consideration.

THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY.

Though the treaty with Spain was ratified in February, 1899, and a few days later the President in an address, speaking of our foreign possessions, said, "This whole subject is now with Congress, and Congress is the voice, the conscience, and the judgment of the American people," nevertheless Congress has not thus far been called upon to determine the status of the peoples of the Philippine Islands. I wish to call attention to this fact and place on public record my emphatic protest against the Philippine policy of the Administration—a policy which has tarnished the honor of the nation, a policy of burdensome taxation and an unwarranted expenditure of money, and waste of human life, and a policy which is contrary to the principles upon which our form of government rests.

I do this with sincerity, placing duty to country above all other considerations.

ORIGINAL PURPOSE VEILED—BAD FAITH PRACTICED.

In our treatment of the peoples of our new possessions we have substituted for the law of justice the maxim of Rob Roy—

That they should take who have the power,  
And they should keep who can.

The claim made that we came into possession of those islands through force of circumstances beyond our control is not true.

We declared to the world at the beginning of the war with Spain that it was not for a mercenary purpose, but for humanity and for the liberation of Cuba.

In a letter from Mr. Williams, our consul at Manila, to Mr. Cridler, dated February 22, 1898, he states:

"The condition here," referring to the Philippine Islands, "and in Cuba are practically alike. \* \* \* A republic is organized here, as in Cuba."

Nothing was said indicating it to be our purpose to enter upon and forcibly retain possession of those islands, thousands of miles from our shores, inhabited by 10,000,000 of peoples, consisting of 84 different tribes, of all colors, from the deepest black to the lightest yellow, and of various customs, and speaking a babel of tongues.

The facts justify me in saying that it was the original purpose of the Administration to obtain and retain possession

of those islands. This intention of the Administration was hidden and not at first disclosed. The people were charmed by patriotic phrases and lured along as the Pied Piper led the children of Hamelin by his music.

The day before the President sent his message to Congress recommending that a resolution be passed declaring a state of war to exist between Spain and the United States, Mr. Pratt, our consul at Singapore, was in consultation with Aguinaldo, the leader of the insurgents, and as a result of the interview he that same day telegraphed to Admiral Dewey:

Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, here. Will come Hongkong arrange with Commodore for general cooperation insurgents Manila, if desired. Telegraph.

PRATT.

Admiral Dewey replied:

Tell Aguinaldo come as soon as possible.

DEWEY.

And the next day Aguinaldo set sail to meet Dewey.

On May 20, 1898, Mr. Pratt sent a letter to Mr. Day containing a translation of a proclamation of the rebel leaders in Hongkong headed "American allies—the manifesto of the Filipinos," in which they called upon their brothers in the Philippines, "where you see the American flag flying assemble in numbers; they are our redeemers." The following is the manifesto referred to:

#### AMERICAN ALLIES—THE MANIFESTO OF THE FILIPINOS.

COMPATRIOTS: Divine Providence is about to place independence within our reach, and in a way the most free and independent nation could hardly wish for.

The Americans, not from mercenary motives, but for the sake of humanity and the lamentations of so many persecuted people, have considered it opportune to extend their protecting mantle to our beloved country, now that they have been obliged to sever relations with Spain, owing to the tyranny this nation is exercising in Cuba, causing enormous injury to the Americans, who have such large commercial and other interests there.

At the present moment an American squadron is preparing to sail for the Philippines.

We, your brothers, are very much afraid that you may be induced to fire on the Americans. No, brothers, never make this mistake. Rather blow your own brains out than fire a shot or treat as enemies those who are your liberators.

Your natural enemies, your executioners, the authors of your misery and unhappiness, are the Spaniards who govern you. Against these you must raise your weapons and odium; understand well, against the Spaniards and never against the Americans.

Take no notice of the decree of the Governor-General calling you to arms, although it may cost you your lives. Rather die than be ungrateful to our American liberators.

The Governor-General calls you to arms. What for? To defend your Spanish tyrants? To defend those that have deceived you, and even in public speeches asked for your extermination—those that have treated you little better than savages? No! No! A thousand times no!

Give a glance at history and you will see that all Spain's wars in Oceania have sacrificed Philippine blood. We have been put to fight in Cochin China to assist the French in an affair that in no way concerned the Philippines. We were compelled to spill our blood by Simon de Anda against the English, who in any case would have made better rulers than the Spaniards. Every year our children are taken away to be sacrificed in Mindanao and Sulu on the pretense of making us believe these people are our enemies, when in reality they are our brothers, like us, fighting for their independence.

And having sacrificed our blood against the English, against the Annamites, against the people of Mindanao, etc., what recompense or thanks have we received from the Spanish Government? Obscurity, poverty, the butchery of those dear to us. Enough, brothers, of this Spanish tutelage.

Take note, the Americans will attack by sea and prevent any reinforcements coming from Spain; therefore we insurgents must attack by land. Probably you will have more than sufficient arms, because the Americans have arms and will find means to assist us.

There, where you see the American flag flying, assemble in numbers. They are our redeemers.



Our unworthy names are as nothing, but one and all of us invoke the name of the greatest patriot our country has seen, in the sure and certain hope that his spirit will be with us in these moments and guide us to victory—our immortal José Rizal.

On June 9 Mr. Pratt sent a letter to Mr. Day giving an account of an address presented to him by the Philippine colony at Singapore after Aguinaldo's success near Manila, in which they said:

Our countrymen at home and those of us residing here, refugees from Spanish misrule and tyranny in our beloved native land, hope that the United States, your nation, persevering in its humane policy, will efficaciously second the programme arranged between you, sir, and General Aguinaldo in this port of Singapore, and secure to us our independence under the protection of the United States.

To this Consul Pratt replied in part as follows:

Rest assured, though, that I fully understand and sincerely appreciate the motives that have prompted your present action, and that your words, which have sunk deep in my heart, shall be faithfully repeated to the President, to Admiral Dewey, and to the American people, from whom I am sure they will meet with full and generous response. (See Appendix for full account—Exhibit A.)

Mr. Pratt did not deny that such an agreement had been entered into with Aguinaldo, as claimed by the Filipinos, whereby their independence would be secured under the protection of the United States. On the contrary, he said:

I am thankful to have been the means, though merely the accidental means, of bringing about the arrangement between General Aguinaldo and Admiral Dewey, which has resulted so happily. I can only hope that the eventful outcome will be all that can be desired for the happiness and welfare of the Filipinos.

I admit that a letter was written by Mr. Day on June 16 to Mr. Pratt, in which he states:

It is assumed that you did not attempt to commit the Government to any alliance with the Philippine insurgents. \* \* \* To obtain the unconditional personal assistance of General Aguinaldo in the expedition to Manila was proper, if in so doing he was not induced to form hopes which might not be practicable to gratify.

This letter, however, was written after Admiral Dewey and his heroic men achieved the glorious victory in Manila Bay, a victory which earned the deserved gratitude of a nation for that intrepid leader and his men, and after Aguinaldo arrived at Manila on one of our ships with thirteen staff officers, at the request of Dewey, and had gathered around him between eight and forty thousand men, who were supplied by us with arms, ammunition, and supplies, and also after they had rendered valuable assistance in subduing and holding the city of Manila, and we had treated them as our allies. That they were treated as allies is evidenced by a letter from General Anderson to Aguinaldo, dated July 6, 1898, from which I quote the following:

Very soon we expect a large addition to our forces, and it must be apparent to you, as a military officer, that we will require much more room to camp our soldiers, and also store-room for our supplies. For this I would like to have your excellency's advice and cooperation, as you are best acquainted with the resources of this country. It must be apparent to you that we do not intend to remain here inactive, but to move promptly against our common enemy.

And in a letter from Major Jones written to Aguinaldo, dated July 17, which said in part:

Our nation has spent millions of money to send forces here to expel the Spaniards and to give a good government to the whole people, and the return we ask is comparatively slight. General Anderson wishes you to inform your people that we are here for their good.

There was no suggestion by us that it was our intention to deprive them of their independence.

It is claimed that Mr. Pratt was not authorized to act for us, yet he was in correspondence with our Secretary of State, and was supposed to keep him informed of what he was doing. If Mr. Pratt believed he did not have authority, he could have cabled Mr. Day before he cabled Dewey and before entering into negotiations with Aguinaldo.

I am justified in claiming that some inducements must have been held out to Aguinaldo. Some political pledges, express or implied, were given; otherwise, why did he, after having at first failed to gather his people around him and was about to sail away, return at the request of Admiral Dewey and successfully accomplish that for which we brought him to Manila.

I appeal to any lawyer on this floor, would he not be justified, if he were arguing a case with facts similar to this, in asserting that there must have been some promise given, *express* or *implied*?

Gentlemen, the American people are the jury in this case, and they will render a just verdict next November.

#### THE REAL POLICY DISCLOSED.

The first time we publicly indicated our purpose to obtain and retain possession of the Philippine Islands was in the communication from our Secretary of State to the minister of state of Spain, in which he declared it to be our intention to occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of the treaty of peace which was to "determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippine Islands."

The majority of the commissioners appointed by the President to negotiate the treaty of peace were members of the Senate—two of whom were on the Committee on Foreign Relations. They represented the Executive to negotiate a compact upon which they were thereafter to sit in judgment as members of the legislative branch of the Government, though the constitutional theory of our Government is that the executive, legislative, and judiciary departments are to be kept separate and distinct.

This commission received definite instructions as to the terms which were to be offered to Spain, though these instructions have never been made public. One of the principal requirements insisted upon by the commission was the cession of the Philippine Islands.

The first article of the protocol gave us authority to occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of the treaty of peace, which was to determine the disposition, control, and government of the Philippines. Nevertheless, the President issued an order to the Secretary of War eleven days after the signing of the Paris treaty by the representatives of both nations, in which he said:

The future control, disposition, and government of the Philippine Islands are ceded to the United States. In fulfillment of the rights of sovereignty thus acquired, and the responsible obligations of government thus assumed, the actual occupation and administration of the entire group of the Philippine Islands becomes immediately necessary, and the military government heretofore maintained by the United States in the city, harbor, and bay of Manila is to be extended with all possible dispatch to the whole of the ceded territory. \* \* \* It will be the duty of the commander of the forces of occupation to announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we come, not as invaders or conquerors, but as friends. \* \* \* The operations of civil and municipal government are to be performed by such officers as may accept the supremacy of the United States by taking the oath of allegiance. \* \* \* Finally, it should be the earnest and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring to them in every possible way that full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the heritage of free peo-

ples, and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule.

(Letter appendix—Exhibit B.)

The President, on January 20, in instructions to the Secretary of State, informed him that he had appointed a commission to facilitate effective extension of authority throughout the islands, and stated that the treaty had not been ratified, but expected it to be by the time the commission arrived at Manila, and that he intrusted the temporary government of the islands to the military authorities until Congress should determine otherwise.

The territory was not ceded to us at this time. The treaty had not been ratified by the President with the consent of the Senate, as provided, nor had the terms of ratification been exchanged between the Governments.

According to the terms of the treaty, until its ratification we had not the right to occupy a foot of territory beyond the city of Manila. We had not succeeded to the sovereignty of Spain, and the Filipinos were not under our authority or sovereignty. Acting under that unauthorized possession, we occupied territory which had been occupied by the Filipinos as conquered territory. Nevertheless, on August 28, 1899, the President, in a speech at Pittsburg, said: "Every step taken was in obedience to the requirements of the Constitution. It became our territory, and is ours as much as the Louisiana Purchase, or Texas or Alaska. A body of insurgents, in no sense representing the sentiment of the people of the islands, dispute our lawful authority, and even before ratification of the treaty by the American Senate were attacking the forces who fought for and secured their freedom. This was the situation in April, 1899, the date of the exchange of ratifications."

Our action was in the nature of a declaration of war upon those people, who had been aiding us, and who had given no offense.

So far, then, from the acquisition of the Philippine Islands being forced upon us as the result of circumstances, it is apparent that their acquisition was contemplated from the beginning.

#### THE TREATY OF PEACE—MANNER OF ITS ADOPTION.

The treaty as made required the assent of two-thirds of the Senate. This number could not be obtained unless heroic measures were resorted to. Our troops and the Filipino forces were at this time facing each other peacefully awaiting the outcome of negotiations with Spain. There were in the Senate, as there are in all bodies, men who are afraid of being suspected of want of patriotism—halting, waiting, wavering men—not men of earnest and pronounced opinions, not men who considered only the public good, but of that class who look particularly to their own political fortunes and want to be on what they suppose the "popular side."

On the morning of the day the vote was to be taken upon the ratification of the treaty news came that our troops were fired upon by the Filipinos, and the wavering Senators went over to the majority. The treaty was confirmed by a single vote over the requisite number.

It was for the advantage of the Filipinos that the treaty should be defeated. If it was not ratified, the United States would not acquire even a paper title to the islands, and nonratification of the treaty meant practical independence for the Filipinos. It was for their interest to avoid a rupture. On the other hand, it



was for the interest of the Administration seeking additional Senatorial votes to bring about a condition of things which would capture the weak and wavering.

FILIPINO HOSTILITY PROVOKED—A PART OF THE PROGRAMME OF AGGRESSION.

General Otis could tell the facts—the real facts—which led to open rupture between our soldiers and the Filipinos at the crucial moment during the pendency of the treaty of peace, and it is quite likely his knowledge of and connection with the real cause of hostilities was one of the reasons for his long retention at Manila despite his unpopularity, the Administration fearing to remove him lest such action might lead to an exposé of this and many other features of the Philippine campaign for which General Otis was held responsible, although under orders from Washington.

It will go into history that the conflict from which the present war followed—a war that has caused a waste of human life and treasure—was brought about to secure the ratification of the treaty and the cession of the Philippine Islands. Regardless of our pledges to the Filipinos and the world, we propose to hold those islands without obtaining or asking the consent of the people and to govern them by laws in the making of which they have had no voice. All this we are told is for “civilization”—shooting them if they do not accept our authority. Let us not pretend to be there for the spiritual good of the people, when in reality we are there for nuggets of gold, mountains of iron and—power.

Civilization—civilization—many sins are committed in thy name.

In the language of Washington, in his Farewell Address, “The maxim is no less applicable to public than to private affairs—honesty is the best policy.”

Jefferson foresaw the present condition when he said, “Indeed, I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just.”

#### WILL COLONIAL IMPERIALISM PAY COMMERCIALLY?

Assuming that the honor of the nation is not tarnished, will it pay us to hold possession of those islands?

The most careful examination of statistics show that the entire product of the islands, consisting of hemp, sugar, and copra, will not exceed \$25,000,000 per year, and the entire imports have not exceeded over \$12,000,000 a year. The cost of maintaining our soldiers in a foreign country is not less than \$1,600 each man, per year. It must be conceded that from 30,000 to 40,000 men will be required permanently in the islands after we have conquered the people into sullen submission.

The 63,000 men we have there now will soon be disabled. Add to that the dead and the sick up to date, and it will reach 80,000. Our pension list is now over \$150,000,000. This war will bring it over \$200,000,000.

Where will we get 63,000 men to replace the men now there?

Add to that the expenses of the Federal lists to keep the people enslaved and force our modern Christianity upon them by the sword.

If the products were all plunder and the exports to the islands were all profit, the maintenance of the Army alone would almost consume the products and exports. The exports to China, about

which we are hearing so much, it is safe to say, do not exceed \$310,000,000.

If it were possible for the United States, by reason of its occupation of the Philippine Islands, to secure the whole of the trade with China and add to it the entire trade of the Philippines, the profit upon it would not equal the cost of maintaining the Army, Navy, and the civil administration necessary to keep the Philippines in subjection and properly carry on their government.

We owe to day \$1,380,000,000—almost \$1,380,000,000 more than England, with her large navy and immense territory—and yet they tell us that it pays.

Verily this Administration needs an arithmetic as much as it needs a conscience.

#### THE COST OF THE PHILIPPINE WAR—IN MEN AND MONEY.

It is safe to say that the cost of the war in the Philippines will reach \$200,000,000 to date. Add to that the expenses of the current year, which will exceed \$100,000,000, and it will be found that the cost of the Government has so increased that a man who has a family of five persons will, before the end of the year, have paid almost \$20 as his share of the cost of our mission of "benevolent assimilation, march of civilization, manifest destination, and plain duty."

If one-tenth of this money's squandered in shooting down fellow-men because they refuse to submit to be treated as subjects, was judiciously employed in developing the harbors of our principal cities, it would call into existence ten times more trade for the country than we possibly can expect by holding those islands as a colonial possession and keeping a people under submission by military rule.

#### TRUE EXPANSION.

The money unnecessarily taken from the people could be used in perfecting the fortifications of our coast and make them more impregnable against the attack of a foreign power, and be used in a way that would materially promote commerce by improving the harbors of our principal cities. Then we would have the true expansion—industrial expansion—manufacturing expansion—commercial expansion. With deep and wide harbors to accommodate the deepest-draft vessels afloat, backed by a merchant marine, our vessels will carry the flag and the trade into every market in the world. This is the expansion we want, and the expansion we must obtain—an expansion that does not require the aid of the sword.

#### EXPANSION OF TRADE AT THE COST OF BLOOD.

Let not our place among the commercial nations of the world be obtained at the sacrifice of human liberty.

Great Britain's object in the war of the Revolution was to control the trade and commerce of the United States. The response of the colonists, through Benjamin Franklin, was as follows:

To me it seems that neither the obtaining nor retaining of any trade, how valuable soever, is an object for which men may justly spill each other's blood—that the true and sure means of extending or securing commerce is the goodness and cheapness of commodities; and that the profit of any trade can never be equal to the expense of compelling it and holding it by fleets or armies, and I am persuaded that cool, dispassionate posterity will condemn to infamy those who advise it, and that even success will not save from some degree of dishonor those who voluntarily engage in it.

#### THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE—LOGICAL EXPANSION.

Much has been said about the purchase of Louisiana. This was contiguous territory and came within the pale of our American system.

It was a territory fit for probatory before coming to statehood. Not so here. The peoples of those islands never can become Americanized. The inhabitants of the Louisiana territory asked to be annexed for their own protection. For their commercial interests, and their commercial rights they wanted to become a part of us. Its acquisition was peaceful and bloodless, and was the first step in the withdrawal of European sovereignty from this hemisphere, and prevented war. Every square mile of additional territory meant more room, more homes, and more opportunities for our people.

#### THE PHILIPPINES A PANDORA'S BOX.

The Philippines we hold possession of through the sacrifice of lives. Their possession brings us within reach of European nations, and we will be obliged to enter into their councils, and if they engage in a war we will be liable to become involved. Even if we subdue the people into submission, a large standing army and navy will be necessary to defend the islands against the ambition and jealousy of other nations.

You can not go to the Philippines to live and work. Those islands only furnish a chance for capitalists to increase their wealth through the employment of cooly, contract, or practically slave labor, the product to be sold in competition with what we produce, while the cost of the army and navy necessary to keep the people in subjection and protect these capitalistic enterprises will be borne by the working people. The evidence is overwhelming that men from the temperate zone can not become acclimated in the Tropics, and such regions must continue to be permanently peopled by their native inhabitants.

Captain Hatch, of the Eighteenth Infantry, who was with the first troops to go to the Philippines and remained there for more than one year, recently stated that—

The climate is that of the torrid zone. There is little difference between July and December. There is a constant, never-ceasing heat, that depresses and enervates the constitution of a man from the temperate clime. An American in the Philippines can not work in the sun or at outdoor labor. He would not live six months at such work. Only a Chinaman, a Filipino, or some one with a dark skin can ever work out of doors in the Philippines. An American may live in the Philippines, pursuing an occupation that would keep him under cover; out of doors, never.

This is borne out by the testimony of Professor Dean C. Worcester and many other authorities. The Philippines, therefore, can not be held as a possession to successfully colonize. If we retain them they will be a "weight around our necks." Let us hesitate before we commit ourselves to the policy of holding them, or we may repent; we will discover too late, that our supposed diamonds of great price are only paste.

#### THE CONSTITUTION STRAINED.

Assuming that by retaining possession of those islands we have not violated national morals, and that from a mercenary standpoint it will pay us to keep them, there are still grave objections to our retention of them.

It can not be questioned but that the United States has a right to acquire territory either by purchase, cession, or conquest, but in holding it we must act within the limits of constitutional authority. In the interpretation of the Constitution it is to be construed in favor of justice, and the same rule should be followed that is adopted in interpreting a statute—that is, it should be construed according to the intention of the framers.

As stated by Chief Justice Taney, 19 Howard, at page 436, Scott vs. Lanford—

The Constitution must be construed now as it was understood at the time of its adoption. As long as it continues to exist in its present form, it speaks not only with the same words but the same meaning and intent with which it spoke when it came from the hands of the framers, and was voted on and adopted by the people of the United States. What the Constitution was at that time I think there can be hardly any doubt.

If we retain possession of those islands and govern them as colonial dependencies, as proposed, our much abused Constitution, which has been stretched and bent under the implied-power doctrine until in many respects it has lost its original meaning, will by this policy receive an additional wrench, and we must read into it the words "colonies" and "subjects." It must be stretched to cover new laws, new officials, new responsibilities, new duties, and new powers.

Instead of an instrument confining and restricting the powers of the Government, our Constitution has come to be regarded as a document in which the Government can find warrant for the exercise of any power.

Procrustes stretched and shortened his victims to make them fit his bed. The proposition now is to make our bed—the Constitution—in which we have rested for over one hundred years, adjustable to whatever giant or dwarf may come along our national highway.

Our Constitution is the foundation of all law. Respect for law is of necessity the foundation of democratic form of government, and whatever is done to undermine or weaken that respect is a source of great danger.

The practice of wresting the Constitution from its plain purpose to meet the exigencies of a particular occasion will have a distinctly pernicious effect upon the morals and conduct of the people, by causing them to regard law as something to be evaded, if possible, and obeyed as a last resort under compulsion. There is no authority, even under the most elastic estimate of the implied powers of Congress, that confers a right upon the United States to hold and govern those possessions as colonial dependencies.

There is no authority, even under the most elastic estimate of the implied powers of Congress, that confers a right upon the United States to hold and govern those possessions as colonial dependencies.

Herein precisely is where our form of government differs from Old World forms. To carry out this proposition, not only must our Constitution be trampled under foot, but the whole history and spirit of our institutions must be defied, and the flag robbed of its brightest glory.

Webster, in his speech in 1848 on the Mexican War, used these words:

An arbitrary government may have territorial government in distant possessions, because an arbitrary government may rule its distant territories by different laws and different systems. Russia may govern the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Kamtschatka by different codes or ukases. We can do no such thing.

To assert this right is contrary to the vital principles of the Declaration of Independence, which the American people have believed in, and have no more questioned their truth, than they have questioned the Ten Commandments or the Sermon on the Mount, and is an insult to the memory of those who pledged their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor for justice and liberty—an



insult to the memory of those who suffered, bled, and died during the seven years' war of the Revolution.

It was against this method of government that the men of the Revolution fought. It can not be assumed that those who composed the Constitutional Convention, many of whom had been leaders in the struggle, and all ardent sympathizers and active supporters of that cause, should turn about and coolly make provisions to fasten upon other people that same galling yoke which they had so recently escaped. Rather is it to be supposed that they had in mind the principles of the Declaration of Independence, that "governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed," and that the freedom which they had fought for and won, they intended sharing with all who might ask the protection of our flag.

STATEHOOD—NOT COLONIAL IMPERIALISM—MUST FOLLOW.

Exclusive Federal control of territory should be but a temporary stage, to be followed by the permanent condition of statehood. Judge Cooley, in his Constitutional Law (page 188), says:

Indeed, it could never have been understood that any territory which by purchase, cession, or conquest should at any time come under the control of the United States should permanently be held in a territorial condition—and when territory is acquired, the right to suffer States to be formed therefrom and to receive them into the Union must follow, of course—not only because the Constitution confers the power to admit new States without restriction, but also because it would be inconsistent with institutions founded on the fundamental idea of self government, that the Federal Government should retain territory under its own imperial rule and deny the people the customary local institution.

The same point is emphasized by Chief Justice Marshall in *Loughborough vs. Blake* (5 Wheaton, 317-324). His language is as follows:

The Territories are in a state of infancy advancing to manhood—looking forward to complete equality so soon as that state of manhood shall be determined.

In reply to the charge that the United States maintain a condition that the colonies denounced Chief Justice Marshall in the same case said:

The difference between requiring a continent with an immense population to submit to be taxed by a government having no common interest with it, separated from it by a vast ocean and associated with it by no common feelings, and permitting the representatives of the American people under the restriction of our Constitution to tax a part of society which is in a state of infancy, advancing to manhood, looking forward to complete equality, so soon as that state of manhood shall be attained, as is the case with the Territories, \* \* \* is too obvious not to present itself to the minds of all.

In *Scott vs. Sanford* (19 Howard, 393-446), Chief Justice Taney said:

There is certainly no power given by the Constitution to the Federal Government to establish and maintain colonies bordering on the United States or at a distance to be ruled and governed at its own pleasure, nor to enlarge its territorial limits in any way except by the admission of new States, but no power is given to acquire territory to be held and governed permanently in that character.

Chancellor Kent, in his *Commentaries*, page 385, states that:

The establishment of distant Territorial governments ruled according to the will and pleasure of Congress would have a very natural tendency, as all preconsular governments have had, to abuse and oppress.

In the case of *Murphy vs. Ramsey* (114 United States, page 15) the language of the courts is as follows:

The power of Congress over Territories is limited by the obvious purposes by which it was conferred, and these purposes are satisfied by measures which prepare the people of the Territories to become States of the Union.

Justice Gray, in the case of *Shively vs. Bollty* (152 United States, 1-57), said:

Upon the acquisition of territory by the United States, whether by cession by one of the States, or by treaty with a foreign country, or by discovery and settlement, the same title and dominion pass to the United States for the benefit of the whole people in its trust for the several States to be ultimately created out of the territory.

The Philippine islands are as much a part of the dominion of the United States as Maine or California, and our sovereignty over the inhabitants is complete.

The Spanish treaty recognizes the nationality of the Spanish subjects remaining in the ceded territory who do not formally record a declaration of their intention to preserve such allegiance, to be held to have renounced it, and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they may reside.

Story on the Constitution, paragraph 1324, referring to territory acquired by conquest or treaty, says:

The ceded territory becomes a part of the United States. The act transferring the country transfers the allegiance of the inhabitants so that they become citizens of the Union thereby.

Hallett on International Law, page 380, holds that—

In either case—conquest or cession—the national character of the inhabitants who remain is deemed to be changed from that of the former to the new sovereign, and that in their relations with other nations they are entitled to all the advantages and subject to all the disadvantages of their new international status.

In the case of the *American Sugar Company vs. Canter* (1 Peters, 511), Chief Justice Marshall said:

On such transfer of territory it has never been held that the relation of the inhabitants with each other undergo any change. Their relations with their former sovereigns are dissolved and new relations between them and the government which has acquired their territory. The same act which transfers their country transfers the allegiance of those that remain in it.

In *New Orleans vs. The United States* (10 Peters, 662) it is laid down that—

The succession of sovereignty does not authorize the United States to exercise prerogatives of sovereignty not consistent with the Constitution of the United States.

In *Johnson vs. McIntosh* (8 Wheaton, 589) it is laid down:

The title by conquest is required to be maintained by force—the conqueror prescribes its limits—humanity, however, acting on public opinion has established as a general rule that the conquered shall not be wantonly oppressed and that their condition shall remain as eligible as is complete with the objects of the conquest. Most usually they are incorporated with the victorious nation and become subjects or citizens of the country with which they are connected. The new and old members of society mingle with each other—the distinction between them is gradually lost, and they make one people. Where this incorporation is practicable, humanity demands, and a wise policy requires, that the rights of the conqueror to property should remain unimpaired—that the new subjects should be governed as equitably as the old, and that confidence in their security should gradually banish the painful sense of being separated from their own connections and united by force to strangers.

#### CAUSE OF LIBERTY UNIVERSAL

If we retain possession of the Philippines, they can not be held as colonies or dependencies; they must be held as territory to be governed within constitutional limitations, with the beacon light of statehood held before them. The same Constitution which governs us must govern these inhabitants; every prohibition which binds Congress here binds it there. The Constitution is for their peoples as it is for us; the sacred rights which the Constitution guarantees are theirs as much as they are ours. Liberty does not

mean one thing in the States and something entirely different in the Philippines.

In the language of Washington, "The cause of liberty is confined to no continent or climate."

This is the most serious question that has confronted us during our existence as a nation. If we hold them, we must make them a part of our Government, and open our doors to the cooly labor of the Philippines, which will enter into competition with American labor, and this reservoir of human labor will hopelessly submerge the workmen of America. "A gulf profound as that Serbonian bog betwixt Damietta and Mount Casius old" will then rise between wealth and poverty, and the workingmen will be ground down to a state lower than before.

#### THE LEAVEN OF ASIATIC DEGENERACY.

Then it will not be a foe from without but a foe from within that we must fear. It is the degeneration and demoralization that will happen if this flotsam and jetsam of the Orient are brought here. When the "war drums throb no longer and the battle flags are furled," there will grow cancer-like in our nation, the discontent of labor. God forbid that the shadow of pre-revolutionary France is upon this nation. Let us hope that the cunning, clever, and unscrupulous demagogues will not have the opportunity to fan the flames of discontent into a fire that will cost millions in treasure and countless lives. Let us hope that the same hand that wielded the sword in defense of our country will, when the sword is beaten into the plowshare, be guiding the development of the country.

To hold the Philippine Islands will not only cause danger from within, but will be contrary to the teachings of the fathers of the Republic, and will be a departure from our traditional policy, which has been "accretion, not colonization."

Washington in his Farewell Address said:

The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. \* \* \* Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or very remote relation. \* \* \* Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. \* \* \* Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. \* \* \* We may choose peace or war as our interests, guided by justice, shall counsel. Why forego the choice of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by entangling our destiny with any part of Europe, entangle the peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalry, interest, humor, and caprice?

No one can deny but that which he warned us against will happen if we retain this territory thousands of miles away. We will not be in a position to choose between peace or war as we desire. No nation possessing foreign colonies has been able to choose between peace and war.

Jefferson, in writing to Madison concerning territorial aggrandizement, when a commercial treaty with England was in prospect, said:

Bonaparte would give us the Floridas to withhold intercourse with the residue of those (the Spanish) colonies. But that is no price, because they are ours in the first moment of the first war, and until a war they are of no particular necessity to us; but although with difficulty he will consent to our receiving Cuba into our Union—that would be a price, and I would immediately erect a column on the southernmost limit of Cuba and inscribe on it "No plus ultra"—"As to us in that direction." We should then have only to include the North in our confederacy, which would be, of course, in the first war, and we should have such an empire for liberty as she never surveyed since the creation.

In a letter to Thomas Paine, March 18, 1801, Jefferson wrote:

Determined as we are to avoid, if possible, wasting the energies of our people in war and destruction, we shall avoid implicating ourselves with the people of Europe, even in support of principles which we mean to pursue. \* \* \* we believe we can enforce those principles as to ourselves by peaceable means, now that we are likely to have our public councils detached from foreign views.

In a letter to William Short, October 3, 1801, on the Monroe doctrine, Jefferson said:

We have a perfect horror at everything like connecting ourselves with the politics of Europe.

On August 4, 1820, in a letter to William Short, he said:

I hope he [referring to the minister to Brazil by the Government of Portugal] sees and will promote in his new situation the advantages of a cordial fraternalization among the American nations and the importance of their coalescing in an American system of policy, totally independent and unconnected with that of Europe. The day is not distant when we may formally require a meridian of partition through the ocean which separates the two hemispheres, on the hither side of which no European gun shall be heard nor an American on the other, and when during the rage of the eternal wars of Europe the lion and the lamb within our regions shall lie down together in peace.

Monroe said in his annual message of December 2, 1823:

In the wars of European powers, in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken any part; nor does it comport with us so to do. With the movements of this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. We owe it therefore to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies and dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere.

Our proposed policy will be a departure from the above.

Webster, on April 11, 1826, in a speech on the Panama mission, came boldly to the defense of the Monroe doctrine and said:

The country's honor is involved in that declaration. \* \* \* I look upon it as a part of its treasures of reputation, and for one I intend to guard it. \* \* \* I look on the message as forming a bright page in our history. I will help neither to erase it or tear it out, nor shall it be by any act of mine blurred or blotted. It did honor to the sagacity of the Government, and I will not diminish that honor.

Edward Everett, Secretary of State, outlines the policy of the United States on territorial growth, in a letter to M. Sártiges, December 1, 1852, when the United States was invited by France and England to become a party to the proposed convention relative to Cuba, said:

England within half a century has added very extensively to her empire. These acquisitions have created no uneasiness on the part of the United States. In like manner the United States have within the same period greatly increased their territory. The largest addition was that of Louisiana, which was purchased from France.

These accessions of territory have properly caused no uneasiness to the great European powers, as they have been brought about by the operation of natural causes and without any disturbance of the international relations of the principal states. They have been followed also by a great increase of mutually beneficial commercial intercourse between the United States and Europe; but the case would be different in reference to the transfer of Cuba from Spain to any other European power—we should view it in somewhat the same light in which France and England would view the acquisition of some important island in the Mediterranean by the United States, with this difference, it is true—the attempt of the United States to establish themselves in Europe would be a novelty.

How much more of a novelty is it to extend our territory in Asia?

Hamilton Fish, who was Secretary of State under General Grant, in a letter to Sir E. Thornton, in April, 1873, stated:

It is not the policy of the United States to undertake in Africa the management of movements within the particular range of private enterprise.



Secretary Frelinghuysen, Secretary of State under President Arthur, in a letter to Mr. Langston, in 1883, said:

The policy of this Government as declared on many occasions in the past has tended toward avoidance of possessions disconnected from the main continent. Had the tendency of the United States been to extend territorial dominion beyond intervening seas, opportunities have not been wanting to effect such a purpose, whether on the coast of Africa, in the West Indies, or in the South Pacific.

In another letter, in 1884, he said:

A conviction that the fixed policy dating back to the origin of our constitutional Government was considered to make it inexpedient to attempt territorial aggrandizement which would require maintenance by a naval force in excess of any yet provided for our national uses—has led this Government to decline territorial acquisition.

Secretary Bayard, in 1885, wrote:

The policy of the United States declared and pursued for more than a century discountenances, and in practice forbids, distant colonial acquisition.

President Cleveland, in his first annual message, said:

I do not favor the policy of acquisition of new and distant territory or incorporation of remote interests with our own.

Our Philippine policy is well described by John Morley in criticizing the foreign policy of England:

First, you push on into territories where you have no business to be and where you had promised not to go; secondly, your intrusion provokes resentment, and in these wild countries resentment means resistance; thirdly, you instantly cry out that the people are rebellious and that their act is rebellion (this in spite of your own assurance that you have no intention of setting up a permanent sovereignty over them); fourthly, you send a force to stamp out the rebellion; and, fifthly, having spread bloodshed, confusion, and anarchy, you declare with hands uplifted to the heavens that moral reasons force you to stay, for if you were to leave this territory would be left in a condition which no civilized power could contemplate with equanimity or composure. These are the five stages in the Forward Rake's progress.

The words of Burke in 1775 apply with equal force at the present time concerning our policy in the Philippines:

To prove that they ought not to be freed, we are obliged to depreciate the value of freedom itself \* \* \* all dread of a standing military force is looked upon as a superstitious panic. We grow indifferent to the consequences inevitable to ourselves from the plan of ruling half the world by a mercenary sword \* \* \* between craft and credulity the voice of reason is stifled and all misconduct, all the calamities of war are continued \* \* \* the use of force alone is but temporary. It may subdue for a moment, but it does not remove the necessity of subduing again, and a nation is not governed which is perpetually to be conquered. A further objection to force is that you impair the object by your very endeavors to preserve it \* \* \* the thing you fought for is not the thing which you recovered.

Students of history and political science are opposed to our Philippine policy.

Andrew Carnegie said:

That Britain possesses her colonies is a mere figure of speech; that her colonies possess her is nearer the truth. Our colonial empire seems a big phrase, but so far as material benefits are concerned the balance is the other way.

Trade does not follow the flag in our day; it seeks the lowest prices current.

It has heretofore been the glorious mission of the Republic to establish upon secure foundations Triumphant Democracy: and the world now understands government of the people, for the people, and by the people. \* \* \* Must the millions of Filipinos, who have been asserting their God-given right to govern themselves, be the first victims of Americans, whose proudest boast is that they secured independence for themselves? If we take these islands we will have to govern them as generously as Britain has governed her colonies. This will leave nothing but a source of expense.

John G. Carlisle said:

There is no room in the Constitution for a military despotism or for the exercise of arbitrary power by the civil authorities anywhere in the jurisdiction of the United States in time of peace, and whenever the Philippine Islands,

Porto Rico, or other islands shall become a part of our territory their inhabitants will be entitled to all the rights, privileges, and immunities secured to the people by the Constitution.

Professor McDonald, professor of history and political science in Bowdoin College, Maine, said:

The permanent governing of outlying districts or colonies in fact, though not in name, is so far foreign to our historic usage, and rests upon so different a theory of national organization, that the adoption of such a course might well be fraught with grave menaces to our whole constitutional system. \* \* \* Instead of being the means of wealth to the mother country, the English colonies have become so great a source of expense that statesmen have wondered whether the load could be much longer borne. \* \* \* The adoption of the policy of national expansion, even upon a moderate scale, means the adoption of a new scale of national taxation and expenditure and opens the doors to administrative outlays, direct and indirect, greatly in excess of those to which we are now accustomed.

Dr. Felix Adler said:

The principle that an inferior class shall be ruled by a superior class is a principle of aristocracy. The principle that no class shall be regarded as politically inferior, but that all shall participate on equal terms in the government, is the principle of democracy. The two principles can not keep house together in the same state. \* \* \* If we accustom ourselves to see millions of persons who live within the territories which belong to the United States excluded from the rights of citizenship on the ground that they are not fitted to exercise them, the question will presently be raised—indeed, here and there it has already been raised—whether on the same ground millions of persons now exercising the franchise within the limits of the United States ought not to be deprived of their rights.

#### OUR "PLAIN DUTY."

What is our duty in the present exigency? All the testimony goes to show that the Filipinos are capable of self-government. Admiral Dewey says they are better fitted for self-government than the Cubans. General Wheeler says:

I consider the Filipinos a very superior people—a people with great possibilities.

"Once to every man and nation comes the moment to decide,  
"In the strife of truth with falsehood, for the good or evil side."

The time has come for us to decide. The sword that was unsheathed for freedom should be used in freedom's cause. The principles of imperialism should not be substituted for the teachings of Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln. We have an opportunity to win the greatest victory we ever achieved—to conquer ourselves and stand by the faith of the fathers. Give to the Filipinos the pledge we gave to Cuba. Give to them their freedom and our protection, and we will have the honor of bringing into existence a new nation, for which posterity will bless us.

#### EXHIBIT A.

[Inclosures.—The Straits Times, June 9.]

MR. SPENCER PRATT SERENADED—MEETING OF FILIPINO REFUGEES AT THE UNITED STATES CONSULATE—THEY PRESENT AN ADDRESS TO MR. SPENCER PRATT AND DRINK TO AMERICA, ENGLAND, AND ADMIRAL DEWEY.

The United States consulate at Singapore was yesterday afternoon in an unusual state of bustle. That bustle extended itself to Raffles Hotel, of which the consulate forms an outlying part. From a period shortly prior to 5 o'clock, afternoon, the natives of the Philippines resident in Singapore began to assemble at the consulate.

Their object was partly to present an address to Hon. Spencer Pratt, United States consul-general, and partly to serenade him, for which purpose some twenty-five or thirty of the Filipinos came equipped with musical instruments. Gradually the crowd gathered in the vicinity of the United States consulate, and, after a little quiet, preliminary music, Dr. Santos, as representing the Philippine community in Singapore, proceeded to read the following address, which was originally drafted in Spanish and then translated into French. The address was read in French, and the following is an English translation:

## THE ADDRESS.

*"To the Hon. Edward Spencer Pratt, Consul-General of the United States of North America, Singapore:*

"SIR: The Philippine colony resident in this port, composed of representatives of all social classes, have come to present their respects to you as the legitimate representative of the great and powerful American Republic, in order to express our eternal gratitude for the moral and material protection extended by Admiral Dewey to our trusted leader, Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, who has been driven to take up arms in the name of 8,000,000 Filipinos, in defense of those very principles of justice and liberty of which your country is the foremost champion.

"Our countrymen at home, and those of us residing here, refugees from Spanish misrule and tyranny in our beloved native land, hope that the United States, your nation, persevering in its humane policy, will efficaciously second the programme arranged between you, sir, and General Aguinaldo in this port of Singapore, and secure to us our independence under the protection of the United States. Our warmest thanks are especially due to you, sir, personally, for having been the first to cultivate relations with General Aguinaldo and arrange for the cooperation with Admiral Dewey, thus supporting our aspirations, which time and subsequent actions have developed and caused to meet with the applause and approbation of your nation. Finally, we request you to convey to your illustrious President and the American people, and to Admiral Dewey, our sentiments of sincere gratitude and our most fervent wishes for their prosperity.

"SINGAPORE, June 8, 1898."

Dr. Santos, having presented the above address to Mr. Spencer Pratt, proceeded, speaking in French, to state his belief that the Filipinos would prove and were now proving themselves fit for self-government. While it would be very desirable that such a government should be under American protection, yet it would be found that the brave Filipinos, who were now driving the Spanish troops before them, were quite fit also to fill offices of civil administration. Referring to certain news which had been telegraphed from Europe, Dr. Santos deprecated the transfer of the Philippines from Spain to any power. He was quite confident that the sympathy of the American people would be with a nation who were struggling to be free.

## THE UNITED STATES CONSUL-GENERAL REPLIES.

After listening to the address, the United States consul-general, also speaking in French, said:

"Gentlemen, the honor you have conferred upon me is so unexpected that I can not find appropriate words with which to thank you and with which to reply to the eloquent address you have just read to me. Rest assured, though, that I fully understand and sincerely appreciate the motives that have prompted your present action and that your words, which have sunk deep in my heart, shall be faithfully repeated to the President, to Admiral Dewey, and to the American people—from whom I am sure that they will meet with full and generous response.

"A little over a month ago the world resounded with the praises of Admiral Dewey and his fellow-officers and men for a glorious victory won by the American Asiatic Squadron in the bay of Manila. Now we have news of the brilliant achievements of your own distinguished leader, Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, cooperating on land with the Americans at sea. You have just reason to be proud of what has been and is being accomplished by General Aguinaldo and your fellow-countrymen under his command. When, six weeks ago, I learned that General Aguinaldo had arrived incognito in Singapore, I immediately sought him out. An hour's interview convinced me that he was the man for the occasion; and, having communicated with Admiral Dewey, I accordingly arranged for him to join the latter, which he did at Cavite. The rest you know.

"I am thankful to have been the means, though merely the accidental means, of bringing about the arrangement between General Aguinaldo and Admiral Dewey which has resulted so happily. I can only hope that the eventual outcome will be all that can be desired for the happiness and welfare of the Filipinos. My parting words to General Aguinaldo were, 'General, when you have proved yourself great, prove yourself magnanimous,' and from the treatment accorded to the recent Spanish prisoners it would appear that he had done so." [Applause.]

At the conclusion of Mr. Pratt's speech refreshments were served, and as the Filipinos, being Christians, drink alcohol, there was no difficulty in arranging as to refreshments. "Long life and prosperity" were drunk to Mr. Consul General Spencer Pratt. Then the American Republic was cheered. Then Commodore Dewey was cheered for his gallant victory. Then England was cheered for sheltering the Filipino refugees.

## PRESENTING A FLAG.

Then Dr. Santos, as the spokesman of the Filipino refugees, again addressed the audience with many complimentary remarks on the gallantry of Admiral Dewey and the skill and foresight of United States Consul-General Pratt, and with glowing forecasts of the prosperity that awaited the Philippine Islands under the new régime. He expressed a desire to have an American flag as a reminiscence of the day's proceedings. Mr. Spencer Pratt, again speaking in French, replied, saying:

"This flag was borne in battle, and is the emblem of that very liberty that you are seeking to attain. Its red stripes represent the blood that was shed for the cause; the white represents the purity of the motive; the blue field stands for the azure of the sky; the stars are the free and independent States of the Union. Take the flag and keep it as a souvenir of this occasion."

At the conclusion of Mr. PRATT'S speech he handed an American flag to Dr. Santos, who received it reverently and waved it exultantly, amidst the cheers of the assembled Filipinos. The flag would, said Dr. Santos, be preserved so that future generations might look at it with pride.

[Singapore Free Press, June 9, 1898.]

## MR. SPENCER PRATT AND THE FILIPINOS OF SINGAPORE—AN ADDRESS OF CONGRATULATION.

A little after 5 p. m. last evening a numerous deputation, consisting of all the Filipinos resident in Singapore, waited upon the American consul-general, Mr. Spencer Pratt, at his residence, and presented him with an address congratulatory of the American successes in the present war, and expressive of the thanks of the Filipino community here for the aid now being given by the United States to the aspirations of the Filipino people for national freedom.

There were also present Mr. W. G. St. Clair, editor of the Singapore Free Press; Mr. A. Reid, editor of the Straits Times, and Mr. Howard W. Bray, whose active sympathies with the Filipino nation are so well known as to entitle him to be styled "Aguinaldo's Englishman." Mr. Spencer Pratt and Mr. Bray both wore the badge of the Liga Filipina, presented to them by General Aguinaldo during his incognito visit to Singapore.

After Mr. Bray had performed the ceremony of introducing the deputation to Consul-General Spencer Pratt, Dr. Santos, the chief Filipino refugee here, who has been educated at Barcelona and Paris, delivered the address, of which the following is a translation:

"THE HON. EDWARD SPENCER PRATT,

*Consul-General of the United States of North America, Singapore.*

"Sir: The Filipino colony resident in this port, composed of representatives of all social classes, have come to present their respects to you as the legitimate representative of the great and powerful American Republic, in order to express our eternal gratitude for the moral and material protection extended by Admiral Dewey to our trusted leader, Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, who has been driven to take up arms in the name of 8,000,000 Filipinos in defense of those very principles of justice and liberty of which your country is the foremost champion.

"Our countrymen at home and those of us residing here, refugees from Spanish misrule and tyranny in our beloved native land, hope that the United States, your nation, persevering in its humane policy, will efficaciously second the programme arranged between you, sir, and General Aguinaldo in this port of Singapore, and secure to us our independence under the protection of the United States.

"Our warmest thanks are especially due to you, sir, personally, for having been the first to cultivate relations with General Aguinaldo and arrange for his co-operation with Admiral Dewey, thus supporting our aspirations which time and subsequent actions have developed and caused to meet with the applause and approbation of your nation.

"Finally, we request you to convey to your illustrious President and the American people, and to Admiral Dewey, our sentiments of sincere gratitude and our most fervent wishes for their prosperity.

"SINGAPORE, June 8, 1898."

The address, which was written in Spanish, and read in French by Dr. Santos, the spokesman, was replied to in French by Mr. Spencer Pratt, to the following effect:

"Gentlemen, the honor you have conferred upon me is so unexpected that I can not find appropriate words with which to thank you, with which to reply to the eloquent address you have just read to me. Reassured, however, that I fully understand and sincerely appreciate the motives that have prompted your present action, and that your words, which have sunk deep in my heart, shall be faithfully repeated to the President, to Admiral Dewey,



and to the American people, from whom, I am sure, they will meet with full and generous response. A little over a month ago the world resounded with the praise of Admiral Dewey and his fellow-officers and men for a glorious victory won by the American Asiatic Squadron in the bay of Manila.

"To-day we have the news of the brilliant achievements of your own distinguished leader, Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, cooperating on land with the Americans at sea. You have just reason to be proud of what has been and is being accomplished by General Aguinaldo and your fellow-countrymen under his command. When, six weeks ago, I learned that General Aguinaldo had arrived incognito in Singapore, I immediately sought him out. An hour's interview convinced me that he was the man for the occasion, and having communicated with Admiral Dewey, I accordingly arranged for him to join the latter, which he did at Cavite. The rest you know.

"I am thankful to have been the means, though merely the accidental means, of bringing about the arrangement between General Aguinaldo and Admiral Dewey which has resulted so happily. I can only hope that the eventual outcome will be all that can be desired for the happiness and welfare of the Filipinos. My parting words to General Aguinaldo were, 'General, when you have proved yourself great, prove yourself magnanimous,' and from the generous treatment that we understand he has accorded to the Spanish prisoners taken in the recent fight he has done so." [Applause.]

Dr. Santos, then addressing his fellow-countrymen (Paysanos), called for successive "vivas" for the President of the United States, for Admiral Dewey, and for Consul-General Pratt; for England, the "nation hospitaliera," and for the editors of the Singapore Free Press and Straits Times. Consul-General Pratt called for "vivas" for General Aguinaldo and the Filipino people.

Mr. Spencer Pratt subsequently presented an American flag to Dr. Santos for the Filipino deputation. "This flag," he said, "was borne in battle, and is the emblem of that very liberty that you are seeking to attain. Its red stripes represent the blood that was shed for the cause, the white the purity of the motive, the blue field the azure of the sky, the stars the free and independent States of the Union. Take it and keep it as a souvenir of this occasion."

On receiving the flag from the consul's hands Dr. Santos called for three cheers for the American nation, waving the flag on high, and stating that the Filipinos would always cherish this emblem, which would be preserved for future generations to look upon with pride.

A band of Filipino musicians was in attendance and played a selection of music, including some very pretty melodies of their native land.

This interesting ceremony terminated about 6 p. m.

#### EXHIBIT B. [Circular No. 4.]

DIVISION OF CUSTOMS AND INSULAR AFFAIRS,  
WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, January 16, 1899.

The following order of the President is published for the information and guidance of all concerned:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, Washington, December 21, 1898.

The SECRETARY OF WAR.

SIR: The destruction of the Spanish fleet in the harbor of Manila by the United States naval squadron commanded by Rear-Admiral Dewey, followed by the reduction of the city and the surrender of the Spanish forces, practically effected the conquest of the Philippine Islands and the suspension of Spanish sovereignty therein.

With the signature of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain by their respective plenipotentiaries at Paris, on the 10th instant, and as the result of the victories of American arms, the future control, disposition, and government of the Philippine Islands are ceded to the United States. In fulfillment of the rights of sovereignty thus acquired and the responsible obligations of government thus assumed the actual occupation and administration of the entire group of the Philippine Islands becomes immediately necessary, and the military government heretofore maintained by the United States in the city, harbor, and bay of Manila is to be extended with all possible dispatch to the whole of the ceded territory.

In performing this duty the military commander of the United States is enjoined to make known to the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands that in succeeding to the sovereignty of Spain, in severing the former political relations of the inhabitants, and in establishing a new political power the authority of the United States is to be exerted for the security of the persons and property of the people of the islands and for the confirmation of all their private rights and relations.

It will be the duty of the commander of the forces of occupation to announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we come, not as invaders or conquerors, but as friends, to protect the natives in their homes,

in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights. All persons who, either by active aid or by honest submission, cooperate with the Government of the United States to give effect to these beneficent purposes will receive the reward of its support and protection. All others will be brought within the lawful rule we have assumed, with firmness if need be, but without severity so far as may be possible.

Within the absolute domain of military authority, which necessarily is and must remain supreme in the ceded territory until the legislation of the United States shall otherwise provide, the municipal laws of the territory in respect to private rights and property and the repression of crime are to be considered as continuing in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals so far as practicable. The operations of civil and municipal government are to be performed by such officers as may accept the supremacy of the United States by taking the oath of allegiance, or by officers chosen, as far as may be practicable, from the inhabitants of the islands.

While the control of all the public property and the revenues of the State passes with the cession, and while the use and management of all public means of transportation are necessarily reserved to the authority of the United States, private property, whether belonging to individuals or corporations, is to be respected except for cause duly established. The taxes and duties heretofore payable by the inhabitants to the late Government become payable to the authorities of the United States unless it be seen fit to substitute for them other reasonable rates or modes of contribution to the expenses of government, whether general or local. If private property be taken for military use it shall be paid for when possible in cash at a fair valuation, and when payment in cash is not practicable receipts are to be given.

All ports and places in the Philippine Islands in the actual possession of the land and naval forces of the United States will be opened to the commerce of all friendly nations. All goods and wares not prohibited for military reasons by due announcement of the military authority will be admitted upon payment of such duties and other charges as shall be in force at the time of their importation.

Finally, it should be the earnest and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring to them in every possible way that full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the heritage of free peoples, and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule. In the fulfillment of this high mission, supporting the temporary administration of affairs for the greatest good of the governed, there must be sedulously maintained the strong arm of authority to repress disturbance and to overcome all obstacles to the bestowal of the blessings of good and stable government upon the people of the Philippine Islands under the free flag of the United States.

WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

This order will be duly proclaimed and enforced.

G. D. MEKLEJOHN,  
*Assistant Secretary of War.*



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